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Abstract
Consider an auction in which k identical objects are sold to n>kbidders who each
have a value for one object which can have both private and common components to it.
Private information concerning the common component of the object is not exogenously
given, but rather endogenous and bidders face a cost to becoming informed. If the cost
of information is not prohibitively high, then the equilibrium price in a uniform price
auction will not aggregate private information, in contrast to the costless information
case. Moreover, for a wide class of auctions if the cost of information is not prohibitively
high then the objects can only be allocated in a weakly e±cient sense, and then only if
the equilibrium proportion of endogenously informed agents is vanishing as the economy
grows. In spite of these results, it is shown that there is a mechanism for which there
exist equilibria and for which (weak) e±ciency is achieved as the economy grows in the
face of endogenous information acquisition.
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11 Introduction
The property of Pareto e±ciency is of fundamental importance in the design and evaluation
of markets. As auctions are used to allocate goods and services in a signi¯cant number
of markets, ranging from government securities to art and procurement, it is important to
understand the e±ciency properties of auctions.
In what follows two types of e±ciency of markets are examined. The ¯rst type is in-
formational e±ciency or the ability of a market to form prices in a way that aggregates
privately held information concerning the value of a good, so that in a large society the price
approximates the true (realized) value of the good.1 This type of e±ciency is the centerpiece
of \e±cient markets hypotheses". The second type is allocative e±ciency or the ability of
a market to allocate goods to those agents who value them most highly. This second type
of e±ciency is essentially Pareto e±ciency, although the versions discussed in this paper are
asymptotic and approximate. While the reasons for caring about allocative e±ciency are
self-evident, the motivation behind informational e±ciency is less transparent, as one might
not care about the informational content of prices, given that goods are e±ciently allocated.
However, a case may be made for informational e±ciency to the extent that information
obtained from prices in one market can be important in guiding decisions concerning invest-
ment or portfolio holdings in markets of other goods (or possibly future purchases/sales of
goods in the given market).2
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997, 2000) have recently shown that uniform price auctions
are approximately informationally and allocatively e±cient with large numbers of agents. 3
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) show that if both the number of objects and the number
of bidders minus the number of objects become large, then uniform price auctions are infor-
mational e±cient in a common value setting.4 The key insight is that it is under this double
1A weaker requirement is to ask for the price to re°ect the expected value of the good conditional on the
join of agents' information. However, in large societies these two requirements are essentially equivalent as
a law of large numbers applies. This discussion largely presumes a common valuation to the good. In cases
where valuations are heterogeneous, a reasonable requirement would be that the price re°ect the valuation
to the marginal consumer, where marginal consumer is de¯ned under an e±cient allocation of the goods.
2Some discussion of this appears in Jackson and Peck (1999).
3See also Swinkels (1999) for analysis of discriminatory auctions.
4Milgrom (1979, 1981) identi¯es a necessary and su±cient condition for informational e±ciency in auctions
where a ¯xed ¯nite number of objects are for sale but with an increasing number of bidders. (See Wilson
(1977) for earlier work under su±cient conditions for such a result.) Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) work
with signal structures that fail to satisfy this strong condition and hence the necessity of their double largeness
condition.
1largeness condition that a bidder's knowledge of being pivotal from a large number of bidders
(and objects) together with knowledge of his or her own signal allows him or her to correctly
estimate the value of the object, even though the single signal may be very noisy. Pesendor-
fer and Swinkels (2000) build on some of the insight concerning informational e±ciency to
study allocative e±ciency in large uniform price auctions, where bidders may have both
private information about a common component of an object's value, as well as a separate
private valuation for another component of the object's value.5 Such a setting presents a
tough hurdle for allocative e±ciency as a bidder may have, for instance, a high private value
and a low estimate for the common value, or vice versa. Thus, an auction must sort out
private information concerning the common component of the value from the private values
themselves, in order to allocate goods e±ciently.6 The remarkable result demonstrated by
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000) in the context of a uniform price (Vickrey style) auction, is
that as the number of bidders and objects grow in a proportional manner (so that the ratio
of objects to bidders is bounded from 0 and 1) then the auction is allocatively e±cient in
the limit, despite the two independent sources of private information. The Pesendorfer and
Swinkels result derives from the fact that bidders tend to sort themselves primarily accord-
ing to private values as their own information concerning the common value is swamped by
the information of being pivotal. In the limit the price depends only on bidders with in-
termediate private values. The price then aggregates agents' private information about the
common value component of the object, and in fact comes to re°ect the ex post valuation
of the marginal bidder under the e±cient allocation. Moreover, Pesendorfer and Swinkels
show that this allocative e±ciency result holds even with costs to acquiring information.
While the e±ciency results of Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997, 2000) seem to reassure us
about both the informational and allocative e±ciency of uniform price auctions, there are
5A non-exhaustive list of papers discussing e±ciency in auctions (with endowed information) includes
Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), and more
recently Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (1998), and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). These recent papers
are discussed in the concluding remarks.
6To see the complication in more detail, consider the intuition behind the e±ciency of a single unit
English auction, which is allocatively e±cient in some cases when types are unidimensional. A bidder can
see the prices at which other agents drop out and from that can infer the relevant content of other agents'
information. With a multi-dimensional type space this sort an inversion is no longer possible. For instance in
a procurement auction, ¯rms bidding on a contract consider both the structure of their costs of production
(which may re°ect current capacity constraints or other idiosyncratic features) and their estimate concerning
the materials, labor, etc. necessary to complete the job. A bidder may not be able to infer to what extent
a competitor's bid is re°ective of their current capacity versus their information about the common cost of
the job.
2two critical features that are worrisome.
The ¯rst worrisome feature is that the informational e±ciency results are only demon-
strated when information is costless. Matthews (1984) has pointed out that informational
e±ciency in some auction settings is critically dependent on such an assumption. Matthews
provides an example of a ¯rst-price auction with many bidders where the informational
e±ciency results of Wilson (1977) and Milgrom (1979) are upset by making information
acquisition costly to the bidders. In the equilibrium, insu±cient information is acquired
for the aggregate of agents' information to re°ect the true value of the object, and in fact
the equilibrium price does not even re°ect the expected value conditional on the join of the
agents' information. To some extent, the example has a similar intuition to that underlying
the Grossman-Stiglitz (1981) paradox: if information were fully re°ected in the price, then
no agent should want to pay to acquire information. Thus, there is an important question as
to whether informational e±ciency is possible in the face of costs of information acquisition.
The second worrisome feature is that of existence of equilibrium. While Pesendorfer and
Swinkels (2000) showed that a sequence of symmetric equilibria in a Vickrey style auction
(if they exist) will allocate objects e±ciently when there is a cost to information, their result
does not provide for existence of equilibrium. This issue of existence of equilibrium is not
simply a detail, as in fact symmetric equilibria may fail to exist. Jackson (1999) shows that
there even in very simple examples symmetric equilibria do not exist in a Vickrey auction
when a private and common component to valuations matter in preferences. The di±culty
stems from the fact that multi-dimensional signals do not sort themselves nicely into bids.
This can result in non-monotonicities and discontinuities in the information inferred from
winning as a function of a bid. These problems can lead to non-existence, as demonstrated
in the aforementioned examples. Thus, to establish that allocative e±ciency is possible in
the face of costly information, one needs to establish equilibrium existence in addition to
other properties of equilibrium.
In this paper I examine the informational and allocative e±ciency of auctions (and general
mechanisms) with large numbers of bidders and objects in the presence of costly information
acquisition.
To be more precise the paper begins by examining informational e±ciency in large com-
mon value uniform price auctions. A very simple proof con¯rms Matthew's intuition and
shows that informational e±ciency must fail with any cost to information, regardless of the
speci¯cs of the setting.7
7A couple of people have remarked to me that one might expect bidders to be incidentally endowed with
enough private information to result in informational e±ciency. However, the fact that there is an industry
3Next, the paper moves on to examine the issue of allocative e±ciency in the presence of
costly information. First, it is shown that if the cost of information is not prohibitively high
(costs are low enough so that with positive probability at least one bidder becomes informed),
then a strong type of allocative e±ciency where all objects are approximately e±ciently
allocated cannot hold in the face of costly information. This holds for a general class of
mechanisms, not just uniform price auctions. To understand this, suppose that every object
were to be approximately e±ciently allocated. Then the allocation must depend almost
entirely on the private values of the bidders, and not on any information about the common
value that they may have observed. Through incentive compatibility conditions implied by
the equilibrium, this also implies that a bidder's expected payment is almost independent of
any acquired information. Bidders thus have no incentive to acquire information given that it
has some positive cost. So no information is acquired. This leads to a contradiction as some
information will be acquired in equilibrium if the cost to information is not prohibitively
high.
This is not the end of the story, however, as one can consider a weaker de¯nition of
allocative e±ciency that does not require that every object be approximately e±ciently
allocated, but only a proportion approaching one of the objects be approximately e±ciently
allocated. Since only a limited number of agents are acquiring information, then there are
still many objects to be allocated to uninformed agents. This however, would require the
proportion of informed agents to go to zero in equilibrium. It is shown that this is a necessary
condition for a weak form of allocative e±ciency to hold in any mechanism.
Finally, the last theorem in the paper shows that a weak form of allocative e±ciency is
attained by an equilibrium of a speci¯c type of auction mechanism. While the mechanism
discussed here is less standard than a Vickrey auction studied by Pesendorfer and Swinkels
(2000), it is still quite simple and more importantly it provides for existence of equilibria
for all admissible preferences and so it establishes that weak allocative e±ciency is generally
possible. The e±ciency comes from the fact that a dwindling proportion of bidders have an
incentive to gather information and the auction almost becomes one of entirely uninformed
agents. Objects may be misallocated to informed bidders, but that is negligible in the limit.
of analysts who are paid to acquire information on various securities (including government securities sold
through auctions) is inconsistent with informational e±ciency holding, since if one expects the price to be
informationally e±cient in a uniform price auction, then one is better o® not acquiring any costly information.
42 De¯nitions
A ¯nite number, k, of indivisible objects are to be sold to n individuals. Each individual
wishes to buy at most one object.
Preferences
Each agent i has a utility for the object which is described by u(ti;q), where ti 2 [0;1]
is a private component and q 2 [0;1] is a common component. It is assumed u is (jointly)
continuous and nondecreasing in (ti;q) and that it is strictly increasing in at least one of
these two parameters. Utility is normalized so that u(0;0) = 0 and u(1;1) = 1. The agent's
utility for obtaining the object and paying a price p is u(ti;q) ¡ p.
E®ectively, the parameters ti can be thought of as introducing heterogeneity in prefer-
ences.
Uncertainty
Individuals' private parameters are random. Agent i's private parameter is described
by the random variable Ti. The Ti's are independently and identically distributed with
distribution function F(¢). Assume that F has a continuous density function f that is
positive on all of [0;1]. Each agent knows his or her own realized value of Ti, denoted ti, but
only the distribution over the Tj's for j 6= i.
The value of the common parameter q is random as well, and described by the random
variable Q, which is independent of the Ti's and described by the distribution function G(¢).
The distribution is non-degenerate so that var(Q) > 0.
Information Acquisition
Individuals have costly access to information concerning the realization of Q. For a cost
0 <c<1, an agent may observe the realization of a random signal Si which provides
information about the value of Q. The Si's take values in [0,1] and are independently and
identically distributed conditional on Q according to the distributions G(¢jQ = q).
Represent an agent's interim information by (ti;s i) 2 [0;1] £ ([0;1] [ f;g), where si = ;
indicates that i has not observed a signal.
The choice to acquire information to be made at an ex-ante stage before agent i has
observed ti. Largely, the results contained here will not be a®ected if instead information
is acquired at an interim stage after agents observe their private type. I discuss this in the
concluding remarks.
5It is also assumed that the act of acquiring information is private. That is, when bidding
in the auction agents will not have observed whether other agents have acquired information
or not. Equilibrium implicitly provides a player with beliefs concerning the other agents'
strategies to acquire information. Again, allowing for observation of who acquired infor-
mation will not substantively change the results, and I discuss this in more detail in the
concluding remarks.
Sealed Bid Auctions
Let X = fx 2f 0;1gn j k ¸
P
i xig. Thus, xi = 1 is interpreted as giving an object to i.
Let ¢ denote the set of Borel probability distributions on X £ [¡1;1]n.
A sealed bid auction is a function Y :[ 0 ;1]n ! ¢, that provides a (possibly random)
allocation of the objects and payment of each bidder as a function of the submitted bids.
b =( b1;:::;b n).
Uniform Price Auctions
A uniform price auction is a sealed bid auction in which all agents who obtain an object
pay the same price, and no agent pays more than their bid (regardless of whether they get
an object).
Formally, Y is such that for each b 2 [0;1]n there is a set Zb ½ X £ [¡1;1]n such that
Y (b) places probability 1 on Z and such that z =( x;w) 2 Zb satis¯es: (i) xi = xj =1
implies wi = wj and (ii) xi = 1 implies bi ¸ wi.
In the above de¯nition, (i) says that if two bidders are both allocated a good then they
pay the same price and (ii) says that the price cannot exceed a player's bid. This is a very
broad de¯nition of uniform price auction and leaves wide open how the objects are allocated
or how the price is selected. For most of the results, it is not necessary to be more speci¯c.
Strategies
A strategy in the information acquisition stage is simply a probability mi 2 [0;1] that
bidder i becomes informed.
Second stage (behavioral) strategies for the auction are functions bi :[ 0 ;1]£([0;1][;) !
[0;1]. So, bi(ti;s i)i si's bid in the auction as a function of i's private type ti and observed
signal si (where si = ; indicates that no information was acquired).
Note that the strategies in the second stage of the game are pure strategies as a function
of i's information set. The randomness in ti provides su±cient mixing so that de¯ning
mixed strategies can be avoided in what follows. Mixed strategies can be de¯ned in the
6obvious way following Milgrom and Weber's (1985) de¯nition of distributional strategies. As
mixed strategies would add nothing to the analysis which follows I avoid the complication
in notation.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium refers to a sequential equilibrium of the two stage game.
3 Informational E±ciency in Common Value Uniform
Price Auctions
In this section, let us specialize to the case of common values where u(ti;q) depends only
on q, which will be written as u(q). This provides the cleanest de¯nition for informational
e±ciency, the best chance for it to be satis¯ed, and is allows for the easiest comparison to
the previous literature.
Following Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997), index a sequence of economies by r. Each
economy in the sequence has a number kr of objects to be sold and a number nr of agents.
Informational E±ciency
A sequence frg of economies and uniform price auctions with corresponding equilibrium
prices fP rg,i sinformationally e±cient if for all " there exists r0 such that for all r ¸ r0
Prob(ju(Q) ¡ P
rj >" ) <" :
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) show that if both kr and nr ¡ kr go to in¯nity, then
a Vickrey auction (with costless signals) is informationally e±cient. The converse holds if
signals are not too informative. Milgrom (1981) shows that if kr is bounded and nr !1 ,
then a necessary and su±cient condition for informational e±ciency (with costless signals) is
to have value distinction which roughly says that there are signals that are arbitrarily more
likely under a higher value of Q compared to a lower value of Q (for each such higher and
lower values).
What I show here is that regardless of the structure of information, informational e±-
ciency cannot be achieved if there is any cost to information. Thus, it was critical to the
previous literature that information was costlessly endowed, and informational e±ciency
results are not robust to even small information costs.
The theorem refutes informational e±ciency by showing that there is a minimum prob-
ability that the price and value of the object di®er by more than a ¯xed amount.
7Theorem 1 For any k and n and in any equilibrium of a uniform price auction, if some
agent chooses to become informed (with positive probability), then







The intuition behind the theorem is direct, and is closely related to the idea behind the
Grossman-Stiglitz paradox: if an agent is willing to incur a cost to acquire information, then
the price cannot already accurately approximate the value of an object. So there must be
a minimum amount of noise in the equilibrium in order to sustain information aggregation.
An important di®erence here is that Theorem 1 holds even for small economies and holds for
a wide variety of price setting mechanisms, whereas Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) assume
price taking behavior. This is an important distinction as discussed in Milgrom (1981). The
formal proof is short and proceeds as follows.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let i be an agent who in equilibrium places positive probability
on becoming informed. Let E(ui) denote i's equilibrium expected continuation utility con-
ditional on i acquiring information and before i observes the realization of Si. Note that i
can bid 0 and guarantee a non-positive expected payment and thus a non-negative expected
utility, and so since i is acquiring information with positive probability in equilibrium it
follows that E(ui) ¸ 0.
An absolute bound on i's expected utility is to suppose that i obtains an object whenever
u(Q) ¸ P and does not whenever u(Q) <P.T h u s
E[max(u(Q) ¡ P;0)] ¡ c ¸ E(ui):
Note that
Prob(ju(Q) ¡ Pj >
c
2






¡ c ¸ E[max(u(Q) ¡ P;0)] ¡ c:
Since E(ui) ¸ 0, it follows from the inequality above that










which simpli¯es to the stated conclusion.
Given that var(Q) > 0, informational e±ciency requires a sequence of equilibria in which
some agents are informed. However, Theorem 1 shows that informational e±ciency is in-
compatible with information acquisition. Thus, we have the following corollary.
8Corollary 1 If c>0, then no sequence of economies and corresponding equilibria where the
second stage is a uniform price auction satis¯es informational e±ciency.
Although Theorem 1 and its corollary have a very simple intuition and proof, its impli-
cations are that information aggregation in auctions is sensitive to the introduction of any
cost of information. Thus, the intuition of Matthews (1984) is con¯rmed. It is clear that
the results also extend to allow for heterogeneity in costs, provided there is a lower bound
on costs for all but a ¯xed number of bidders.
As a ¯nal remark on informational e±ciency, note that the results above do not preclude
weak versions of the e±cient markets hypothesis. The price is not precluded from revealing
information. For instance, Milgrom (1981) examined costly information acquisition in k-
object Vickrey auction, and showed an example where it is possible to have fully revealing
\prices" in spite of costly information acquisition. There the price that a bidder faces is
the k-th highest bid of the other agents which reveals a su±cient statistic for the relevant
information of a bidder's opponents. This, however, does not imply informational e±ciency,
nor could it given Theorem 1 above. To understand the di®erence, note that Milgrom's
result does not imply that enough information is gathered to accurately re°ect the value
of the good - and in fact Theorem 1 here implies that there must be a limit on how many
bidders collect information and that the price could never come to approximate the value of
the good.
4 Allocative E±ciency in Direct Mechanisms
Next, let us examine the possibility of allocative e±ciency in large economies. While the
intuition behind the results on informational e±ciency is quite simple and consistent with
that in the earlier literature, the issues behind allocative e±ciency are more subtle.
For the remainder of the paper maintain the assumption that u(ti;q) is strictly increasing
in each variable. This guarantees that the allocation problem is non-trivial as both ti and
q matter in agents' valuations. Also, for simplicity, in this section assume that Q has a
¯nite support and that GSi(¢jQ = q) has the same ¯nite support S ½ [0;1] for each q in the
support of the distribution of Q.
I work with the general class of direct mechanisms, so that any auction or market design
is admitted.
Direct Mechanisms
9Any auction procedure and equilibrium can be identi¯ed with a direct mechanism that
corresponds to the interim stage (after agents have observed any acquired information). A
direct mechanism cannot be explicitly dependent on who is informed or uninformed except
through their reported types. The de¯nitions below can be extended to the case where the
act of acquiring information is publicly observed, with the obvious modi¯cations.
A direct mechanism is a pro¯le ¼ =( ¼1;:::;¼ n);Á =( Á1;:::;Á n) of functions where
¼i : ([0;1] £ ([0;1] [ f;g))
n ! [0;1] and Ái : ([0;1] £ ([0;1] [ f;g))
n ! [¡1;1]. So, given
an announced pro¯le of information (t;s)=( t1;:::;t n;s 1;:::;s n), ¼i(t;s) is the probability
that i gets an object and Ái(t;s) is the expected payment of i.
The de¯nition of direct mechanisms does not need to allow for correlation between alloca-
tions of the objects or payments, given the risk neutrality of the agents. Also, no restrictions




Vi(ti;s i; b ti; b si;m ¡i)=E[ui(ti;Q)¼i(T¡i;S ¡i; b ti; b si) ¡ Ái(T¡i;S ¡i; b ti; b si) j ti;s i;m ¡i]:
Vi represents i's expected utility conditional on knowing his or her own type ti, the informa-
tion acquisition strategy m¡i, observing si, and reporting b ti and b si. This does not account
for costs of information, which are handled separately below. This also takes other bid-
ders' announcements to be truthful which is implied (as usual) by incentive compatibility,
equilibrium, and the revelation principle as discussed below.
A direct mechanism (¼;Á)i sinterim incentive compatible with respect to m if for all i,
almost every (t;s) (given m)
Vi(ti;s i;t i;s i;m ¡i) ¸ Vi(ti;s i; b ti; b si;m ¡i)
for any (b ti; b si) 2 [0;1] £ (S [ f;g).
Information Incentive Compatibility
A direct mechanism (¼;Á)i sinformation incentive compatible if there exists an equilib-
rium (of the corresponding two stage mechanism with information acquisition) for which the
direct mechanism is interim incentive compatible with respect to the equilibrium information
choices m in the ¯rst stage.
The Revelation Principle
10The revelation principle applies at the interim stage after information is observed, so that
considering any equilibrium of the two stage (information acquisition game) with respect to
a given auction, there is a corresponding direct mechanism that is information incentive
compatible.
Allocative E±ciency
Consider a sequence of direct mechanisms f(¼r;Á r)g, on economies f(kr;n r)g, with cor-
responding information equilibria. Let tr denote the lowest ti of any i obtaining an object
and t
r denote the highest ti of any i not obtaining an object. These are random variables.
A sequence of information incentive compatible mechanisms f(¼r;Á r)g, with correspond-
ing information equilibria and (tr;t




Allocative e±ciency is a strong condition because it requires that in the limit, not even
a single object that is sold is grossly misallocated.
Given a mechanism (¼;Á), let
¼i(ti;s i; b si;m ¡i)=E[¼i(T¡i;S ¡i;t i; b si)j si;m ¡i]:
and
Ái(ti;s i; b si;m ¡i)=E[Ái(T¡i;S ¡i;t i; b si)j si;m ¡i]:
These represent i's expected probability of getting an object and expected payment when
announcing ti; b si, conditional on si and m¡i.
11Theorem 2 Let fkr;n rg be a sequence of economies such that nr !1and kr
nr ! a 2 (0;1).
Consider a sequence of information incentive compatible direct mechanisms, f(¼r;Á r)g, with
corresponding information equilibria, such that
P
i ¼r
i = kr almost surely and Á
r
i(ti;s i; b si;m r
¡i)
is nondecreasing in b si 2 S for each i and almost every ti;s i.8 If there is a non-vanishing
probability that at least one agent acquires information,9 then the sequence is not allocatively
e±cient.
As the statement of the theorem above requires all kr objects to be sold, it implicitly
prohibits reserve prices that are non-trivially binding. However, the result is extendible to
situations where the number of objects awarded is bounded below in probabilistic terms.
This can be handled as the de¯nition of allocative e±ciency does not require that all the
objects be allocated, only that the ones that are allocated be e±ciently allocated.
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in the appendix. The intuition behind Theorem 2 is
as follows. In the limit, applying an appropriate version of a strong law of large numbers,
allocative e±ciency implies that for an arbitrarily large proportion of the types (ti's) above
the critical level of t¤ = F ¡1(1 ¡ a), the probability of obtaining an object approaches 1,
regardless of a bidder's information (or lack thereof), and similarly for types below t¤ the
probability goes to zero, regardless of their information (or lack thereof). Then incentive
compatibility implies that a bidder's expected payment must converge to be approximately
independent of the signal and only dependent on ti, in which case the bidder has no incentive
to gather information. This implies that no bidders acquire information.
Thus, another way to see the theorem is to say that the only way in which allocative
e±ciency is possible is to have nobody acquire information in equilibrium. However, there
cannot be an equilibrium which is allocatively e±cient and has nobody acquiring information
if costs are not prohibitively high. Thus, we ¯nd the following corollary.
Say that signals are nontrivially informative if ProbfE[u(ti;Q)jSi] 6= E[u(ti;Q)]g > 0 for
a positive measure set of ti.
Corollary 2 Let fkr;n rg be a sequence of economies such that nr !1 , kr
nr ! a 2 (0;1),
and signals are nontrivially informative. Let f(¼r;Á r)g be a sequence of information incentive




8Note that the requirement is only that Á be non-decreasing at b si 2 S and does not say anything about
b si = ;.
9If nr
I is the equilibrium number of informed agents (which may be random), then the requirement is
simply that there exists b>0 such that Probfnr
I ¸ 1g >bin¯nitely often on the sequence.
12almost surely and Á
r
i(ti;s i; b si;m r
¡i) is nondecreasing in b si 2 S for each i and almost every
ti;s i. There exists c>0 such that if 0 <c<c, then the sequence is not allocatively e±cient.
To understand the corollary, note that from Theorem 2 we know that in such a sequence
if allocative e±ciency is satis¯ed, then the probability of having any information acquired
is going to zero. Thus, with probability approaching 1 every agent reports ti;;. Also,
allocative e±ciency implies that ¼i is going to 0 for arbitrary proportions of ti <t ¤ and to








approximately E[u(t¤;Q)] for an arbitrarily large proportion of the ti >t ¤ and t0
i <t ¤. Thus,
any sequence of allocatively e±cient mechanisms must converge to e®ectively be a mechanism
where agents simply have an option to buy at a ¯xed price of E[u(t¤;Q)], and where agents
are not choosing to become informed. However, for such a mechanism an informed agent has
a higher expected utility than an uninformed agent.10 So, if c is not prohibitively high, any
sequence of equilibria must have the probability of information acquisition bounded below by
a positive number and so allocative e±ciency cannot be attained. If costs are prohibitively
high, the it is possible to achieve allocative e±ciency, as no bidder will acquire information
and hence the auction is essentially of pure private values as information about Q plays no
role.
The Role of Non-decreasing Payments
A su±cient condition for Á to be non-decreasing in b si is that Á(t;s) be non-decreasing
in si. This applies to standard auctions, provided agents bid as non-decreasing functions of
their information, which at least for some auctions follows naturally under the conditon that
Si satis¯es the monotone likelihood ratio property relative to Q.11
Nevertheless, there are mechanisms which violate this condition and achieve allocative
e±ciency. Thus, the condition is important to theorem 2 and the corollary above. To see this
most easily, consider an example where signals are perfectly informative, so that informed
agents observe Q. Consider the following mechanism. Each agent announces ti;s i. Let n¤
be the smallest integer greater than or equal to
p
n.I f # fi : si 6= ;g 6= n¤, then no
objects are allocated and no payments are made. Similarly, if there exists i and j such
that ;6 = si 6= sj 6= ; then no objects are allocated. We are left with the case where
#fi : si 6= ;g = n¤ and there is some q such that si 6= ; implies si = q. In this case
10An informed agent can purchase whenever E[u(ti;Q)jsi] >E [u(t¤;Q)], which given the non-trivial
information structure is a superior decision rule to purchasing whenever E[(ti;Q)] >E [u(t¤;Q)].
11See Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000) for a proof that bidding functions are non-decreasing in symmetric
equilibria of Vickrey Auctions.
13objects are allocated to the k agents who announced the k highest ti's (with ties broken
by any method). Those agents pay u(tk+1;q) where tk+1 is the k + 1-st highest announced
ti. Provided that information is not too costly, there is an equilibrium to this mechanism
where exactly n¤ agents acquire information and every agent announces truthfully. This
mechanism is allocatively e±cient.12 Here Ái is not monotone in signals, illustrating the role
of the condition in the theorem.
While this example keys o® of the perfect signals, it is easily adaptable to work as long
as signals are correlated with Q. Using methods similar to those in Cr¶ emer and McLean
(1985), one can structure the payments of the n¤ agents so that truthful announcement of si
outweighs any potential gain in manipulating the price, and that those agents have incentives
to become informed (rather than announce a guessed si).13 This requires payments schemes
that are not monotonic.
Weak Allocative E±ciency
Allocative e±ciency is a strong condition in that it requires all allocated objects to be
approximately e±ciently allocated. Instead we may consider a de¯nition which only requires
a proportion approaching 1 of the allocated objects to be e±ciently allocated. This turns
out to be an important distinction.
Let ui(ti;s)=E[ui(ti;Q)jTi = ti;(S1 :::;S n)=s].14 Thus, ui(ti;s) denotes i's expected
utility given private type ti and the complete vector of signals s.
















T and T are thus random variables (as they are functions of t;s), and the ratio T=T gives a
measure of how well an auction allocates objects.
12This mechanism fails miserably when it comes to the multiplicity of equilibrium. However, given that it
simply points out the importance of nondecreasing expected payments in Theorem 2, multiplicity is not an
issue.
13The idea is that using the announced s¡i, one obtains information about Q. This leads to information
about the distribution on si, which is di®erent from the unconditional distribution. Payments are made
to be higher conditional on si's that should be more likely given what others have announced, and lower
conditional on si's that are less likely given what others have announced. This may require payments that
exceed the maximum value of the object.
14This is a version of the conditional expectation, and so it is de¯ned even for vectors s that would not be
possible in equilibrium.
14A sequence of direct mechanisms, f(¼r;Á r);m rg, and corresponding information equilibria15




r < 1 ¡ "g <" :
Theorem 3 Let fkr;n rg be a sequence of economies such that nr !1and kr
nr ! a 2 (0;1).
Consider a sequence of information incentive compatible direct mechanisms f(¼r;Á r)g with
corresponding information equilibria such that kr ¸
P
i ¼i almost surely and ¼r
i(ti;s i; b si;m r
¡i)
is nondecreasing in b si 2 S for each i and almost every ti;s i. If the sequence is weakly





The proof of Theorem 3 appears in the appendix. The ideas are very similar to those
behind the proof of Theorem 2. In order for an agent to pay to become informed, it must be
that for a signi¯cant portion of private types, he or she expects to have some variation in the
probability of getting an object as a function of the observed signal (as otherwise, by incentive
compatibility, the expected utility would be roughly constant in announced signal which is
inconsistent with information acquisition). So, if a non-trivial portion of the population is
paying to become informed, then there is a positive probability that a non-trivial portion
of the objects will be misallocated by a signi¯cant amount, which is inconsistent with weak
allocative e±ciency.
5 A Weakly Allocatively E±cient Mechanism
Theorem 3 leads one to doubt whether there exist sequences of auctions which satisfy weak
allocative e±ciency in the face of costly information acquisition. We know from Theorem
3 that satisfying weak allocative e±ciency requires the equilibrium proportion of informed
agents to vanish. I now show that there exists a simple mechanism for which there always ex-
ists a symmetric equilibrium and for which sequences of such equilibria in growing economies
satisfy weak allocative e±ciency.
In this section assume that there is a ¯nite set S ½ [0;1] such that G(SijQ = q) has
support in S for each q. This is weaker than the assumption maintained in the previous
section as the support need not be the same for di®erent q's nor are any assumptions placed
on the distribution of Q.
15Note that mr is important in determining the distribution over s, and thus the distribution of T=T.
15Given an economy k;n, consider the following mechanism. Agents announce si and either
yes or no. Objects are awarded among the agents announcing yes. If more than k agents
announce yes, then the k objects are randomly assigned (with equal probability) among the
agents announcing yes. If k or fewer agents announce yes, then each receives an object and
the remaining objects are not sold. If agent i is assigned an object, then he or she pays
E[u(t¤;Q)jS¡i = s¡i], where t¤ is some ¯xed level.
Theorem 4 Let fkr;n rg be a sequence of economies such that nr !1 , kr
nr ! a 2 (0;1).
For any c ¸ 0, there exists a sequence of symmetric equilibria of the mechanism described
above (setting t¤ = F ¡1(1 ¡ a)) such that the sequence is weakly allocatively e±cient.
Note that in addition to proving weak allocative e±ciency, Theorem 4 also provides
for the existence of equilibria for any sequence of admissible economies. The existence is
not merely a footnote, but an important issue in this setting. Pesendorfer and Swinkels
(2001) have shown that a sequence of symmetric equilibria (if they exist) in a Vickrey style
auction will satisfy a version of weak allocative e±ciency with costs to acquiring information.
However, that result's implications are then only interesting if we are sure that there exist
(symmetric) equilibria to the Vickrey auction. Existence of equilibria to the Vickrey auction
when individuals have a private and common signal turns out to be problematic. In fact,
Jackson (1999) shows that existence can fail in the Vickrey auction even in very simple
examples with nice monotonicity properties in each dimension of signal. The di±culty comes
from the fact that high (or intermediate) bids of other bidders might indicate high private
value rather than high common value. This can lead to discontinuities in the information
learned as a function of winning conditional on a bid. Such discontinuities can lead to non-
existence of equilibria. The extent to which existence is a problem for the Vickrey auction
with multiple dimensions of signals is an open issue, with the only examples currently being of
non-existence.16 The mechanism de¯ned here overcomes the existence problem as it greatly
simpli¯es the decisions that players must make, as they cannot in°uence the price they face
and must only declare whether they desire an object or not.
16Existence of equilibrium can be established if one augments the bidding space to allow for announcements
of signals as well as bids, as shown by Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame (2001). However, those equilibria
might not have the properties required in the Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000) analysis. One possibility is
to use the Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame result to demonstrate existence of equilibria with the larger
strategy space, and then to show that under some conditions that the extra announcement of signals is not
needed (which is shown to work in a private values setting in Jackson and Swinkels (1999)). It is not clear
how well that approach will work outside of a private values setting, given the non-existence example in
Jackson (1999).
16The proof of Theorem 4 appears in the appendix. The ideas behind it are fairly straight-
forward. As the announced si does not a®ect an agent's payo®, it is a best response for each
agent to announce si truthfully. An uninformed agent can then simply say yes if ti ¸ t¤ and
no if ti <t ¤, as there is nothing they useful they can learn that is not already incorporated
in the price they face. Informed agents use their knowledge of si in deciding whether or not
to say yes or no, as it gives them information not re°ected in the price that they face. They
still, however, have a reasonably easily described strategy for saying yes which is monotone
in ti. After establishing existence, it is shown that weak allocative e±ciency holds. Given the
strategies of the uninformed, it is enough to show that the proportion of informed goes to 0.
In fact, it is shown that either the number of informed is bounded (which happens whenever
there is a positive cost to information), or else the strategies of the informed approximate
saying yes when ti >t ¤ and no if ti <t ¤, in which case they would be better o® not acquiring
information. This follows from the fact that if there are a growing number of informed, then
si provides little information that is not already in the price that i faces.
6 Concluding Remarks
The de¯nitions of e±ciency in this paper have ignored the costs of information acquisition.
However, adding those costs explicitly into e±ciency de¯nitions makes no di®erence to the
results, since the results imply that to achieve either type of allocative e±ciency the number
(or proportion) of agents acquiring information must go to zero. So, the proportion of
society's resources wasted on information acquisition must go to zero if (weak) allocative
e±ciency is to be attained.
The treatment of information acquisition in this paper has focused on the case of ex-ante
acquisition and non-observability of acquisition. All of the results can easily be extended to
the case where information acquisition is publicly observed, with some modi¯cations to the
proofs. Whether an agent knows exactly how many others have acquired information, or only
has an estimate, does not signi¯cantly change behavior and the intuition goes through. A
change to interim information acquisition, however, does introduce some new aspects to the
analysis, as incentives to acquire information will depend on an agent's realized private type.
Theorems 1 and 3 and Theorem 4 will go through based on the same logic, again with some
modi¯cations to the proofs. However, Theorem 2 concerning the strong form of allocative
e±ciency must be weakened to claim that a vanishing proportion (rather than number) of
agents must acquire information. The agents who choose to acquire information can be the
marginal types (ti's increasingly near t¤) and this can be consistent with allocative e±ciency.
17In fact, the mechanism in Theorem 4 would have this feature in the interim information
acquisition case.
Throughout the paper it has been assumed that information concerning private values
is free and only the common aspect is costly. The motivation for this is that information
on private type (e.g., personal circumstances, capacity, etc.) is likely to be incidental or
a by-product of other activities, while information on a common component is more likely
to involve active research. Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (1999) examine e±cient allocations in
settings where all information is costly.17 They show that there are interesting di®erences
in the possibility of reaching e±ciency in private versus non-private value settings, with the
former setting allowing for e±ciency, but not always the latter. Interestingly, the costly
information in the setting explored here concerns the common aspect, and yet approximate
e±ciency is still achievable. This suggests that more study is needed to see where the divide
between costly aspects of information and costless aspects needs to fall in order to be able
to reach e±cient allocations, and also how much the consideration of approximate e±ciency
rather than exact e±ciency makes a di®erence.
It also appears that part of the reason that the model examined here leads to e±ciency (at
least approximately) is that interdependencies in valuations arise only through the common
Q. If interdependencies take other forms, e±ciency can be impossible to achieve even with
costless information. Examples of this can be found in Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and
Maskin (1997), and a general result showing problems in reaching e±cient allocations with
multi-dimensional signals can be found in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). The extent to which
such di±culties in achieving (exactly) e±cient allocations arise is well-outlined by Jehiel and
Moldovanu. It may be interesting to explore in more detail what sorts of informational
settings allow for versions of approximate e±ciency studied here in large economies.
17In situations where both components are costly, the problem also begins to look more like (but not
exactly like) auctions with an entry cost where many questions concerning e±ciency are still open. See Gal,
Landsberger, and Nemirovski (2001) for a recent examination of auctions with entry costs that could serve
as a interesting basis for a further analysis of e±ciency properties.
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20Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: Considering a subsequence if necessary, let Probfnr
I ¸ 1g >bfor
any r. Let t¤ satisfy F(t¤)=1¡ a. Let tr be the kr-th out of a sample of nr draws. By













rj >" g) <" :
Noting that max(tr;t
r) ¸ tr ¸ min(tr;t
r), it follows that for any " there exists r" such that
for all r>r "
Prob(fjt
r ¡ t




¤j >" g) <" : (2)
Let Air
" denote the event that either ti >t ¤ + " and i does not get an object or ti <t ¤ ¡ "













This implies that there is at least one i in any economy r>r " such that mr
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¡i) > 1 ¡ ±: (4)
Let si be the smallest si 2 S. Incentive compatibility and the fact that Á is nondecreasing
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21for any si 2 S. (4) and (5) then imply that
jV
r




i(ti;s i;t i;s i;m
r
¡i)j < 2± (6)




i(ti;s i; b si;m
r
¡i) <± : (7)









i(ti;s i;t i;s i;m
r





2 >±>0 (noting that 3 is the maximum swing in utility from announcing si
correctly versus simply announcing si). Thus, from (4), (7), and (6) it follows that for i to
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2 >±>0. Given the same ¯nite support on Si for each q, it follows from (8) that















where 1 ¸ ®>0 is a constant depending only on the underlying distributions of Si and Q.






i ). Then Prob(S¡ijSi = b si) ¸
P
q Prob(S¡ijQ =
q)®0Prob(Q = qjsi), and so the fact that ¼r
i(ti; b si; b si;m r
¡i) >® 0¼r
i(ti;s i; b si;m r
¡i) follows. A
similar argument gives the other inequality for an ®00 and take ® to be the min of these two.
Finally, set ± = c
4 and then for a small enough ", (3) and (9) lead to a contradiction. So our
supposition was wrong and the theorem is established.
Proof of Theorem 3: As in the proof of Theorem 2, it follows that (9) holds for any i with
mr
i > 0 and any 0 <±<c
2.
Suppose that nr
I=nr does not converge to 0, and take a subsequence such that nr
I=nr ! d>0.
By a similar argument to that in the proof of Theorem 2, weak allocative e±ciency then im-
plies that for any " and large enough r there are informed agents for whom ProbfAir
" j Birg <
k", where k is a constant depending on d. Again, set ± = c
4 and then for small enough " we
reach a contradiction.
22Proof of Theorem 4: Let us ¯rst establish that there exists an equilibrium to the mecha-
nism.
Fix any information strategy m. I show there exists an equilibrium in the subgame that
follows. First, as si does not a®ect the probability that i is awarded an object, nor the price
that i pays, it is a best response to announce si truthfully. Next, it is a best response for an
uninformed i to say yes if ti ¸ t¤, and no otherwise. So we need only describe equilibrium
strategies conditional on being informed.
Consider an informed i. Suppose that each other j 6= i's strategy conditional on being
informed and of type tj;s j can be described by saying yes if tj >¿ j(sj) and no otherwise,
for some ¿j : S ! [0;1]. I ¯rst show that i's best response can then be characterized by such
a function ¿i. It is a best response for agent i to say yes if
E[(u(ti;Q) ¡ E[u(t
¤;Q)jS¡i])Zi(S¡i;¿ ¡i)jsi;m ¡i] > 0; (10)
and no otherwise, where Zi is the probability of i getting an object conditional on saying
yes when S¡i is observed by the other agents who are following strategy ¿¡i, and where
Sj = ; when j is not informed. Note that the left hand side of inequality (10) is continuous
and strictly increasing in ti, and so i's best response may be characterized by setting ¿i(si)
to be the ti that equates the left hand side to 0, setting ¿i(si) = 0 if the left hand side is
positive for all ti and ¿i(si) = 1 if the left hand side is negative for all ti. Thus, we have a
well de¯ned ¿i as a function of each ¿¡i and m¡i, and we can write ¿i = Ãi(¿¡i;m ¡i). Note
that each ¿i may then be thought of as a #S dimensional vector, and that Ãi is single valued
and continuous in ¿¡i;m ¡i. Moreover, write Ãi as a function of only a single pair ¿j;m j,
under the restriction that each j 6= i plays the same strategy. Next, let ºi(¿j;m j)b et h e
correspondence that takes value f1g if the following expression is greater than 0, [0;1] if the




¤;Q)jS¡i))Zi(S¡i;¿ ¡i)jm¡i]] ¡ c;
where t¡i and m¡i are the symmetric strategies where each j 6= i plays ¿j and mj, ¿i =
Ãi(¿j;m j), and I is the indicator function. This expression is the ex-ante di®erence in ex-
pected payo®s from playing the second stage informed versus uninformed, and so ºi represents
the best response in information choices given ¿j and mj. This correspondence is compact
and convex valued. Also, as this expression is continuous in ¿j;m j, it follows that ºi is upper
hemi-continuous. So we can apply Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem to the pair Ãi;º i to ¯nd
a ¯xed point which then constitutes a symmetric equilibrium.
23To complete the proof, let us verify that a sequence of such equilibria is weakly allocatively
e±cient for any c ¸ 0. If E[nr
I=nr] ! 0, then by Markov's inequality it follows that that
for any ">0, Prob(nr
I=nr ¸ ") ! 0. Then weak allocative e±ciency follows from the
strategies of the uninformed (and the fact that the potential number of bidders saying yes
over the number of objects kr is going to one (again by the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem)). So,
divide the sequence of enconomies into those for which E[nr
I] ¸
p




nr.18 Along the second subsequence, we know that weak allocative e±ciency
holds.
So consider the ¯rst subsequence, where E[nr
I] ¸
p
nr. It follows from the martingale
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where SN is a vector of N observations of (informed) signals Sj. Fixing any °>0, again by
Markov's inequality there exists r° such that if r>r °, then for any i
Prob(n
r
I ¸ N" j m
r
¡i) > 1 ¡ °:
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18As for the claim made following theorem 4 that the number of informed is bounded if c>0, in the place
of
p
nr we could use any Nr such that Nr !1and N
r
nr ! 0 and the following arguments would still hold.
These imply that the informed strategies converge to the uninformed strategies regardless of cost, and so it
cannot be that nr
I !1if information is costly.
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So, ¯x any ti >t ¤ and let w = minq[u(ti;q) ¡ u(t¤;q)], noting that w>0 by the continuity
and monotonicity of u. Find ° so that ° +
2°
º < wa








For any ti >t ¤, there exists r such that for all r>r and any i, ¿r
i <t i. A similar argument
holds for t0
i <t ¤. Thus, ¯xing any " there exists r" such that for all r>r " and any i,
t¤ ¡ "<¿ r
i <t ¤ + " for all i. Thus, on the selected subsequence we can conclude that weak
allocative e±ciency holds. As it also holds on the other subsequence, the conclusion of the
theorem follows.
25